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THE ROLE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS IN WATER SUPPLYlJPLANNING: 
AVOIDING THE FALLACY OF COMPOSITION 
by Jay C. Andersen ~I 
Things are not always as they seem. Presented here are a fe\'J 
examples of first impressions and possible errors in thought patterns. 
As an example, by some means the size of the earth is to be increased by 
one foot in diameter. Transcontinental Airlines and others are concerned 
with how much further it will be around the circumference of the earth. 
What is your answer? Quick! What's your answer? 
You probably over-estimated. Turn to an analytical system. 
C = 1T 0 
where C = circumference 
o = diameter 
Then, with change in D (60) , we can calculate 
6C = 1T6D 
or, 6C = 3.1416 X 1 
= 3.1416 feet 
Fortunately, a system can lead us to a correct determination. Inspection 
and first impressions often fail. 
How do we interpret trends? We may observe the stability in growth 
in certain variables and project as Mark Twain did:1I 
In the space of one hundred and seventy-six year, the 
Lower Mississippi has shortened itself two hundred and 
forty-two miles. That is an average of a trifle over one 
mile and a third per year. Therefore, any calm person, 
who is not blind or idiotic, can see that in the Old 
Oolitic Silurian Period, just a million years ago next 
November, the Lower Mississippi River was upward of one 
million three hundred thousand miles long, and stuck 
out over the Gulf of Mexico like a fishing-rod. And by 
the same token, any person can see that seven hundred and 
forty-two years from now, the Lower Mississippi will be 
l/Paper presented at U. S. Army Corps of Engineers Conference on 
Water Supply Planning, Albuquerque, New Mexico, March 20-23, 1978 . 
.£/professor and Head, Department of Economics, Utah State University, 
Logan, Utah, 84321. 
lIMark Twain, "Life on the Mississippi ," THE FAr~ILY MARK TWAIN, 
Harper & Brothers, New York, p. 86. 
only a mile and three-quarters long, and Cairo and New 
Orleans will have joined their streets together, and be 
plodding comfortably along under a single mayor and a 
mutual board of aldermen. There is something fascinating 
about science. One gets such wholesale returns of conjec-
ture out of such a trifling investment of fact. 
In economics we often refer to the fallacy of composition. What 
is the "fallacy of composition"? The fallacy is, "What is true for the 
individual or part is necessarily also true for the group or whole." 
Let's turn to some examples that are more directly involved with 
water resources than Mark Twain's example. 
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Example: Increased water supply to a farmer increases production so that 
he realizes a bumper crop. The farmer's income is larger than formerly. 
Therefore, if water supply is increased to all fanners, they will be 
better off. This applies to farmers as a group. 
Wrong. Because price declines as total output goes up, and as 
all farmers realize bumper crops, price is depressed. If price declines 
overbalance the large output, farm incomes fall. Whether total income 
rises or falls depends oupon the price elasticity of demand for the products; 
that is, the coefficient of change in relative quanitity as compared to the 
relative change in price. For most agricultural products, the demand is 
inelastic so that price varies relatively more than quantity. Thus, as 
quantity is increased, price is forced down relatively more so that total 
income to farmers falls. 
That's an easy example. It's plain to see the fallacy of extending 
the finding beyond its logical limits. In economics the difference between 
the individual and the aggregate is distinguished as micro-economics and 
macro-economics. Let's turn to some examples that are less obvious. In 
water supply analysis, a systems approach provides the macro view that 
avoids the fallacy of composition. 
Example: Improvements in irrigation efficiency lead to increases in welfare. 
Not necessarily. Begin with the concept of irrigation efficiency. 
It's definition is the ratio of the amount of water consumptively used in 
evapotranspiration of plants to the amount of water diverted. Thus, the 
higher the proportion of the diversion actually used up, the more efficient 
the system. The problem arises in the distinction of the incentive system 
at the micro (farm) level and the results in a basin-wide context. Individual 
proprietors seek to increase their efficiency because their water right is 
often defined in terms of the amount that they are authorized to divert 
from the canal or stream. They see the opportunity to (1) distribute water 
more evenly and increase yields, and (2) irrigate more acres with a better 
water supply because of careful husbandry. They may do this by spr"inkling, 
improving canals and ditches, leveling the land, or simply applying more 
intensive labor and management to the irrigation process. As might be 
expected, a smaller proportion of water diverted from streams and canals 
returns to the downstream water flow. 
In the Sevier River Basin in Utah, which is a closed basin, many 
have said that the flow of the river is entirely diverted seven times. 
3 
The accuracy of this statement cannot be attested, but it seems to be 
approximately true. In the Sevier Basin when upstream users adopt improved 
irrigation practices and irrigate more acres with a full-season supply, the 
water supply to the lower basin becomes lessened. This happens despite a 
court decree that allocates portions of the flow to upper and lower 
basin users. Whether overall welfare is increased or decreased depends on 
the relative values of the upstream and downstream uses and the cost of 
the improvemnts. As a certainty there arises an equity problem. Legal 
actions have become commonplace in the Sevier Basin. 
It is a problem. Farmers who want to improve irrigation say that 
irrigation water rights are property rights. They claim they can do as 
they please with these rights. They stress that not being able to expand 
acreage reduces incentive to conserve water and become efficient. 
But, what of the downstream user who also has a patented water 
right and a long-standing use of water coming from the upstream return flows? 
Is the water right less valid? Only the courts can decide this equity issue. 
It is clear that any analysis of this water supply bearing on the economic 
efficiency and equity of the situation must depend on an overall system 
evaluation. 
Example: Each of a group of farmers sell one-fourth of their direct flow 
water rights for use in an energy development so that we expect a decline 
in agricultural production. 
Not necessarily. In one case where this has happened, the power 
company paid farmers perhaps 10 times the agricultural value for a portion 
of the water right sold and has built a dam to store and regulate the flow 
of the river. This has provided for a season-long availability of water. 
Lined canals and other conveyances have been built to improve the conveyance 
efficiency of the delivery system so that a greater proportion of the 
vlater is actua-Ily delivered. In summary, the water supply the farmers have 
is more secure and in greater quantity, especially in the late part of the 
year, than was formerly the case. A cursory pre-evaluation could have led 
to erroneous conclusions. 
Example: For energy projects it is proposed to adopt a "tota '1 containment" 
policy for water diverted to prevent the salty water from returning to the 
river in order to insure a higher guality water in the lower reaches of the 
river. 
It may not work: There are two parts to the quality problem. The 
measurement may be salt load, which is the total quantity of salt flowing 
down the river in a dissolved state. Or, the measurement may be concentra-
tion, which indicates the proportion of salt to a given amount of water. 
Each of these may be important depending on the particular concern in the 
downstream area. 
In a river modeling study of the Colorado River, the results suggest 
that as energy development with total containment proceeds through time, 
the total tons of salt load would decrease relative to the base situation. 
Compare lines 1 and 3 in Table 1. As can be seen in Table 1, the salt 
load would be decidedly higher with medium rather than the high energy 
utilization level which would l~ad to greater flows. The salt load 
would be small under high utilization and the consequent 10~1 flow. 
At the same time, salt concentration in the river would rise 
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with accelerated energy development. The conclusion is that an increased 
rate of energy development would result i n an increase in concentration 
at Imperial Dam. This effect is due to the reduced flows of water for 
dilution particularly due to the anticipated total containment technology. 
A situation which seems to escape some concerned parties is that water 
returned from once-through cooling in the upper basin is likely of better 
quality than the quality of water flowing in the lower basi n. 
Table 1. Predicted Salinity Effects at Imperial Dam of Al ternative Future 
Uses in the Colorado River Basin 
Assumed Flow Sal t Load Sa 1 t :'. 
~1 i 11 ion Ac re (Million Concentration 
Feet/Year Utilization Level ton/year) (mg/l) 
Agric. Energy Export 1977 1983 1990- 1977 1983 1990-
2000 2000 
14 Medium Medium Medium 916 912 784 828 922 1090 
14 High Medium Medium 927 920 790 844 956 1162 
14 Medium High Medium 916 905 755 828 928 1142 
14 Medium Medium High 872 875 780 839 937 1097 
Source: Bishop, A. B., J. C. Andersen, et. ale IIColorado River Regional 
Assessment Study,1I Prepared for National Commission on Water 
Quality, Utah Water Research Laboratory, Utah State University 
Logan, Utah. Part 1, pp. 156-158. 
It appears that energy may have significant impacts on local and 
regional water allocations and quality. Upon whom the impacts fall will 
depend to a great extent on institutional and economic constraints and incen-
tives which are imposed, either as a result of historical development or 
future policy directions. It is not so clear that energy development will be 
a detriment to either upstream or downstream users of the Colorado River. 
Investigations of the problem have lacked depth and a broad systems 
perspective in many cases. The case of the total conta i nment technology 
being represented to solve salinity problems is an example. If only one 
side (in this case the salt load) is considered, the answer to the problem 
may be different than if other factors are brought to bear, ~;uch as having 
water for dilution and the extra costs incurred. A strong objective look 
at the social, economic, and physical problems is suggested. 
Example : Use of recreation facili.ties adjacent to a reservoir tends to be 
self-limiting because of aversion to congestion so that a socially optimal 
rate of use is achieved. 
Not with free access. 11 Social or economic welfare is generated 
by the use or exp 1 oi ta ti on of a free but fi xed faci 1 i ty. The di vergence 
between marginal social and private costs leads to resource misallocation. 
The services of the common facility directly enters the utility functions 
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of consumers. Crowding is perceived by users as a deterioration in the 
guality of the services rendered by the facility. In effect., incremental 
use of the facility reduces the marginal utility function of the individuals 
who consume the services of the facility. An allocative efficiency problem 
results because unrestricted use of the facility generates costs in the 
form of utility reductions that are not borne by ma rginal users. 
In Figure I, the curve TWP ' represents the total willingness of 
users to pay for the services of a reservoir recreation facility with 
specified quality. This function reflects normal demand conditions for 
the service. The curve TC represents the constant long-run time and 
travel costs required to gain access to and make use of the facility. 
If incremental use of the fac i lity generates no congestion costs, the opti-
mal level of use would occur where economic surplus (T~~P - TC) is maximized. 
This is shown as X*. 
If the facility is of limited capacity, however, crowding effects 
~ill begin to occur after some level of use, say Xc. The resulting decrease 
ln the perceived quality of the facility and reduction in the value of its 
services to users entails congestion costs. The sum of "production" and 
congestion costs is shown as TC'. The socially optimum level of facility 
use occurs at X**, where net economic surplus (TWP - TC ' ) is maximized. 
$ 
o x** 
I 
I I 
~~ TWP* /,j.7 ~ 
Cit' ~ 
I 
I 
I 
x*** x* 
Figure I 
WP 
TC' 
TC 
x 
i/ This example follows Haveman, R. H. "Common Proper'ty, Congestion, 
and Environmental Pollution" Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1973, 
No.2. pp. 278-287 
However, under conditions of open access the level of facility 
use will not be restricted to X**. The situation can be conceptualized 
by constructing a separate schedule of users' willingness to pay at each 
stipulated level of facility use beyond X (implying some level of total 
congestion costs). Because congestion co~ts are borne by facility users, 
the functions depicting these schedules lie below the ori ginal TWP. The 
level of each function at the stipulated quantity of facility use (X) 
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shows users l total willingness to pay, given that quantity of use. The 
slope of each function at the stipulated X indicates the value to marginal 
users of an increment in facility use. For example, if the level of facility 
use is set at X*, aggregate congestion costs equal ab and, with all of 
these costs borne by facility users, net total willingness to pay is X*c· 
A segment of this function is shown as TWP*, TWP**, and TWP***, which 
. depicts function segments for use levels X*, X**, and X***, respectively. 
By focusing on the socially optimal use level X**, it is clear why 
facility use will not be voluntarily restricted to that level. As use of 
the facility extends beyond X**, total congestion costs increase beyond 
their optimal level of alb', and the constructed total willingness-to-pay 
function shifts down from its optimal level of TWP**. The level of use of 
the facility will increase until the marginal willingness to pay associated 
with a particular level of use is equal to the slope of TC. In Fi gure I, 
this equilibrium level of use is X*~*. AtX***, ,the net economic welfare 
attributable to the services of the facility is b"c", which is less than 
the maximum achieveable welfare increment of b'c ' obtained by restricting 
facility use to X**. In this congestion case, overuse is encouraged because 
real crowding costs imposed by users on each other are not reflected in 
marginal use decisions. 
In this congestion case, resource misallocation and welfare loss is 
self-limiting, but not to an optimum level. Both the extent of over-use 
and the welfare loss reach an upper bound caused by deterioration in the 
quality of the services rendered by the facility. In effect, the 1f?vel of 
facility use is limited by the feedback of congestion on willingness to pay 
in much the same way that the imposition of a price or charge rations the 
facility. Use of the facility is halted before the economic \<Jelfare generated 
by the generated by the activity is driven to zero. But use goes beyond 
the social optimum rate. A mechanism to ration use (price, permits, etc.) 
could be useful. In summary, a planner is ob1"igated to analyze the ' use 
and congestion of the recreation facility, not just the total use and inte-
rests and willingness of individual users. 
Example: The community of North Logan, Utah, has a surface municipal water 
s~pply that is inadequate by itself during 8 to 10 months of the year. The 
Clty ha~ the choice of using its own well or buying water from neighboring 
Logan Clty. One would assume that the community should choose the source 
for augmentation of supply and stick with it . . 
Watch out for a different kind of situation that requires more than 
a superficial examination. The pump is on a large well, and the lift is 
up to the reservoir, which is a lift of 600 feet or so. The pump has a 
100 horsepower electric motor. Utah Power and Light Company has a two-part 
power tariff. The first part is a "demand" charge. This charge is related 
to the motor horsepower and is a substantial minimum flat rate that must be 
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paid in any month when the pump is turned on. The second part is based on 
power used above the minimum. Therefore, in some months when only minimal 
augmentation of the surface water is needed, the cost of pumping a few 
gallons of water is exhorbitant. In some months in the summer, a substan-
tial amount of water is needed so the cost of pumping each gallon is quite 
reasonable. Our town buys water from Loqan City when a small amount is 
needed and pumped when Logan City's price is higher. Again ~ it is necessary 
to look at the details. 
Example: A closed groundwater basin that is recelvlng no recharge should be 
most sparingly and carefully used to extend its life. 
But, what about present value concepts in which any positive rate 
of discount of the future makes income in the near term more valuable 
the same amount in the distant future. A closed groundwater basin is 
essentially a mine. Following Anthony Scott, ~ the theory of the mine 
can be represented as in Figure 2. 
In this case, the value of the resource is not the same for every 
unit extracted as it is for most minerals. There is declining marginal 
productivity. Notice that either too rapid or too slow rate of resource 
withdrawal is inefficient as defined by the difference between total 
revenue and total cost or the profit curve. 
In Figure 2, A is the rate of maximum current profit per acre foot 
of water and B indicates the maximum profit per irrigation season. These 
two rates define the range of relevant values. Now, whctt is the optimum? 
Clearly, if those who control the water have only one more year or season 
after which they can withdraw no more water, then the appropriate rate is 
B, the maximum profit for the year. If there is no discount on future 
income and if the amount of the reserves and present and future costs and 
prices are all known, then profit per acre foot should be maximized at A. 
But, to maximize the present value of the resource, future profits must 
be discounted. Any rate of interest above zero induces owners of the 
water to shorten the life of the groundwater mine. Thus, operators 
increase the rate of extraction toward B, the maximum rate of profit per 
season. 
Let us now introduce the concept of user cost. In Figure 3, we 
have UC and UC' . . UC' is at a higher rate of discount than U . User cost 
is defined as the present value of profits foregone by a decision to use 
a unit of water today. Note that with a higher discount rate less future 
profit is foregone by using the resource today. Thus, as rate of discount 
is increased, the optimal rate of extraction increases from C to D. In 
each case this represents the maximum difference between the profit curve 
and user cost. Thus, the water users are not motivated toward maximum 
conservation. In this case, like others, high interest rates (discounts 
on the future) discourage conservation and preservation. 
'i/ Anthony T. Scott. liThe Theory of the Mi ne Under Condi tions of 
Certainty. II in Mason Gaffney (ed) Extractive Resources and Taxation. 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. 
Ave 
Me.. 
it 
If< 
.... e 
I4VP 
KA+~ 0+ £ ~ rya c.f It> PI 
TR 
Figure 2. The Theory of the Mine Relating Various Economic Variables 
to Rate of Extraction 
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Figure 3. The Effect of a Change in Discount Rate on User Cost and the 
Optimal Rate of Extraction 
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Example: A drought comes where a city has first rights to the surface 
water. Downstream irrigators can have what1s left over. Put a brick in 
the toilet, shower with a friend, and save water. We must conserve. 
That1s the usual campaign. But let1s look at it. In the city of 
Logan, Utah, and several others in the ~lountain West and .elsewhere, the 
city water comes from surface flows and flows downhill to the city. The 
water that goes to the city is used both inside and outside the house .. 
Water that stays in the pipes (inside use) goes back through the sewer 
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and treatment facilities and is returned to the river. There is no evi-
dence that water is lost by going through toilets, showers, tubs, and sinks. 
Of course, water consumptively used in lawns and gardens does not return 
to be used for irrigators. Credibility has been lost by well·-meaning 
people campaigning for conservation inside. Most thinking people see through 
the sha-Ilowness of such arguments. Better not cry wolf when there is no 
danger. We see again that conservation by saving is relevant only for 
stock type resources. Purely flow resources cannot be saved. 
Example: In avoiding contamination of water supply with elements such as 
phosphorus, the most appropriate approach is to keep the material out 
of the waterway in the first place. 
Not always so. Sources may be diffuse and difficult to corral. 
That term may be most appropriate since feedlots and irrigation return 
flows are common examples. There are probably several options for manage-
ment including the possibility of limited or no action to let downstream 
users take the effluent if that is most efficient. Figure 4 is a systems 
model for phosp~orusmanagement. Note that there are valves or control 
points at various places in the system. Each option should be analyzed 
to achieve the most efficient management scheme. 
A systems approach is essential to look at the ramifications, causes, 
and effects of any change as it occurs over space, among users, through 
time, and as between management options available. It is seldom true 
that there is only one answer or only one way to look at a water supply 
problem. To avoid the fallacy of composition and to achieve efficiency and 
equity in resource mangement, an open mind and sweeping view i s essential. 
Remember Mark Twain. Don1t go beyond the range of your data and analytical 
model. Worse yet is if you don1t have an analytical model. 
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Figure 4. Phosphate Source, Use, and Final Destination with Possible Points of Control. 
